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Abstract
This paper evaluates a large-scale pilot program run by a company called OPOWER, previ-
ously known as Positive Energy, to mail home energy use reports to residential utility consumers.
The reports include energy conservation information as well as social comparisons between a
households energy use and that of its neighbors. Using data from a randomized natural eld ex-
periment at 80,000 treatment and control households in Minnesota, I estimate that the monthly
program reduces energy consumption by 1.9 to 2.0 percent relative to baseline. In a treatment
arm receiving reports each quarter, the e¤ects decay over the months between letters and in-
crease again upon receipt of the next letter. I provide evidence to suggest that at least some of
this e¤ect is because consumersattention is malleable and non-durable. I show that proling,
or using a statistical decision rule to target the program at households whose observable charac-
teristics predict larger treatment e¤ects, could substantially improve cost e¤ectiveness in future
programs. The results provide additional evidence that non-price nudges can substantially
a¤ect consumer behavior.
JEL Codes: C44, D03, L94, Q41.
Keywords: Social norms, attention, energy demand, randomized eld experiments, statis-
tical treatment rules, proling.
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1 Introduction
Climate change has emerged as one of the most pressing issues of the early 21st century, and many
consider energy e¢ ciency to be a promising approach to reducing energy demand and thus abating
greenhouse gas emissions. Historically, economists and policymakers have had the intuition that
relative prices are the primary driver of adoption of energy e¢ cient technologies and behaviors.
As a result, subsidies for energy e¢ cient capital goods draw the vast majority of federal and state
energy e¢ ciency funding (Gillingham, et al, 2006).
Perhaps spurred by an increasing general interest in behavioral economics, there has been a
recent surge in the appeal of non-price interventions that "nudge" consumers to conserve energy.
Non-price interventions are typically inexpensive to implement relative to subsidies, and as demon-
strated by Bertrand, et al, (2010) in the context of consumer nance, carefully-crafted psychological
cues can have e¤ects on consumer behavior that are comparable to large changes in relative prices1.
A principal challenge, however, is to craft interventions that are scalable and have large e¤ects in
a representative population.
This paper econometrically evaluates a large-scale energy conservation program run by a com-
pany called OPOWER, previously known as Positive Energy, for an electric utility in Minnesota.
The OPOWER program is implemented as a randomized controlled natual eld experiment, al-
lowing an unbiased estimate of average treatment e¤ects in the eligible population. The treatment
involves mailing to residential consumers Home Energy Reports with two principal features. The
rst feature is an Action Steps Module that provides information, specically targeted to each
household, on strategies to conserve energy. The second is a Social Comparison Module that de-
tails the households electricity consumption and compares it to that of its one hundred nearest
geographical neighbors in houses of comparable size.
This social comparison feature was motivated by academic work showing that normative com-
parisons can signicantly a¤ect individual behavior. Empirical work by psychologists and political
scientists has shown that information on social norms can induce people to conserve energy (Gold-
stein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008), vote (Gerber and Rogers 2009), or stop littering (Cialdini,
Reno, and Kallgren 1990). This social inuence literature has developed alongside work by econo-
mists on social learning2 and conditional cooperation in the private provision of public goods3.
The e¤ects of Positive Energys program are of practical interest for two reasons. First, inde-
pendent estimates of the energy use reductions caused by the Home Energy Reports are important
1For their study, Bertrand, et al, partnered with one of the largest banks in South Africa to o¤er new loans
to existing clients, via letters that varied both the interest rate o¤er and other psychological cues. They varied
the number of di¤erent potential loans that were presented (to test whether greater choice could overload decision-
making), how the interest rate was compared to some market benchmark, the race and gender of the person in a photo
on the o¤er letter, the expiration date of the o¤er, whether the o¤er is combined with a promotional giveaway, and
whether the letter mentions suggested uses for the loan. Consistent with economic theory, they found that consumers
that had been o¤ered lower interest rates were much more likely to take up the loans. They also found, however,
that any one psychological cue could a¤ect takeup by almost as much as a one to two percentage point change in
the monthly interest rate. See Allcott and Mullainathan (2009a and 2009b) for further discussion of applications of
non-price approaches to energy conservation suggested by recent research in psychology and economics.
2This literature includes Banerjee (1992), Beshears, et al, (2009), Conley and Udry (Forthcoming), Duo and Saez
(2002, 2003), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2005), and others. In these settings,
agents make a choice under uncertainty and draw inference from othersbehavior because others may have distinct
and useful information.
3Recent work on conditional cooperation includes Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001, Shang and Croson (2004),
Frey and Meier (2004), Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman (2008), and others. These studies demonstrate
that people are more likely to contribute to public goods when informed that others are contributing more.
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per se. The program has been covered in the New York Times (Kaufman 2009), the Atlantic (Tsui
2009), National Public Radio, and other popular media outlets. It has been introduced at 20 utili-
ties, including six of the largest ten in the United States, and by the end of 2009 nearly two million
households will be involved nationwide. Other utilities are considering adopting the program, and
credible documentation of the magnitude of it e¤ects will a¤ect the disposition of millions of dollars
in potential investment.
Second, the success or failure of the OPOWER program is also of more conceptual interest.
Whether this program is perceived as successful will inuence whether future energy e¢ ciency
programs are inuenced by ndings from behavioral science and evaluated via randomized controlled
trials4. If the program has economically signicant e¤ects, it would be a remarkable illustration
of the e¤ectiveness of non-price interventions compared to the existing large rebates for energy
e¢ cient durables.
The point estimates of the Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE) of OPOWERs monthly Home
Energy Reports for the households served by this Minnesota utility range from a 1.9 to a 2.0
percent reduction in electricity consumption relative to the control group. The 95 percent condence
intervals in the four primary specications span a range from 1.52 to 2.31 percent. Because of the
large sample size and randomized control group, the estimated ATEs are highly robust to alternative
specications of xed e¤ects and control variables. The e¤ects appear to vary depending on the
envelopes in which they are delivered, the time elapsed since the beginning of the treatment, and
the season.
The point estimate of the cost e¤ectiveness of the existing Minnesota program is 5.25 cents of
program cost per kilowatt-hour saved. This number, which could di¤er substantially by geographic
region and by the scale of the program5, compares favorably to the price-based approaches of
traditional energy e¢ ciency programs. A principal general-interest result of this analysis is the
demonstration that a low-cost, non-price intervention - simply sending a letter - can signicantly
a¤ect consumer behavior. This adds to the growing empirical literature on the power of behavioral
interventions, or "nudges," in a variety of domains, including Bertrand, et al, (2010), Benartzi and
Thaler (2004), Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), and others.
The experiment was designed to test the e¢ cacy of the overall treatment, not to provide evi-
dence on the mechanisms underlying the e¤ects. The existing data do provide suggestive evidence,
however, of several behavioral issues at play. Program households were randomly assigned to groups
that would receive Reports every month versus every quarter. Interestingly, the Quarterly group
treatment e¤ects decay in the months between receiving Reports, then increase again with the
receipt of the next Report, then decay again. The decay is economically signicant, as it consti-
tutes almost half of the treatment e¤ect. Survey evidence indicates that an important result of the
Reports is to increase day-to-day energy conservation behaviors, such as turning o¤ lights and un-
plugging appliances, that households already knew could save energy. This suggests that the decay
in the Quarterly group is the result of a cycle in which receiving a letter reminds or motivates the
4OPOWERs Home Energy Reports are but one example of a wide variety of energy e¢ ciency programs that util-
ities operate to satisfy regulatory requirements, including information campaigns, energy audits and weatherization,
and rebates for purchasing energy e¢ cient durable goods such as lightbulbs, air conditioners, and water heaters. The
causal e¤ects of these programs are typically estimated using the "deemed savings approach": multiply the number of
participants by ex-ante "engineering estimates" of the energy savings per participant relative to some counterfactual.
While those in industry have long questioned the accuracy and precision of deemed savings and other approaches
(e.g. Nadel and Keating (1991)) and are aware of the conceptual benets of randomized controlled trials, there is no
consensus on how the e¤ects of energy e¢ ciency programs should be measured.
5Allcott and Mullainathan (2009a, 2009b) calculate a cost e¤ectiveness of 2.9 cents/kilowatt-hour for a nationwide
OPOWER program using a simple proling rule.
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household to change behaviors, the attention fades over time, and it is re-engaged upon receiving
the next quarters Report.
The attention channel would be consistent with part of the "Focus Theory of Normative Con-
duct" in psychology, which originally motivated OPOWERs social comparisons (Cialdini, Reno,
and Kallgren 1990). One element of this theory applies bounded attention to social norms, arguing
that social norms a¤ect behavior only when at top of mind and suggesting that this attention can
dissipate over time. This e¤ect would also be similar to the "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back"
dynamic in consumer credit, where credit card fees remind consumers to avoid triggering fees in
the future, but that reminder e¤ect decays over months (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson
2006). More generally, the suggestion of bounded and malleable attention is consistent with a grow-
ing theoretical and empirical literature in economics, including Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009),
Finkelstein (2009), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and others.
Econometric results also show that households that were high energy consumers before the
treatment conserve substantially more than households whose baseline consumption was low. This
is consistent with models in which low-consumption households have higher marginal costs of energy
conservation or are already better informed. Alternatively, this nding is also consistent with one
of the chief concerns in providing information on social norms: while individuals worse than the
norm may improve, a "boomerang e¤ect" might cause those better than the norm to regress (Clee
and Wicklund 1980, Ringold 2002).
This nding of heterogeneous treatment e¤ects also implies that "proling," or targeting future
treatment toward units with highest Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects, could raise the Average
Treatment E¤ect on the Treated and thus improve the programs cost e¤ectiveness. The nal
section of the paper builds on this insight to develop a statistical treatment rule under which a
decisionmaker who wishes to treat some share of the population in a future program allocates
treatment to maximize the expected treatment e¤ect. The routine draws on a recently-growing
literature6 on using the results of randomized experiments to develop statistical decision rules
for future treatments. Dehejia (2005), for example, shows that a program that would not be
implemented based on examining the ATE alone would increase welfare if implemented in subgroups
that have higher Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects. I show that if the OPOWER program were
to be administered to half of the eligible population, proling would improve its cost e¤ectiveness
by a factor of two relative to random assignment. This demonstration of the potential usefulness
of proling is an additional general-interest economic result of the present analysis.
This paper proceeds by providing background on OPOWERs pilot experiment in Minnesota.
Section 3 details the econometric strategy, and Section 4 presents results. Section 5 details the
statistical treatment rule and gains from proling, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experiment Overview
2.1 Motivating Literature
Social scientists have long been aware that social norms can a¤ect individual behavior. There is
a large experimental literature in psychology that shows that providing people with information
on social norms can have powerful inuence (Cialdini 2003, Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius
2008, Gerber and Rogers 2009, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). This could occur for a number
6This literature includes Berger, Black, and Smith (2000), Dehejia (2005), Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2009),
Hirano and Porter (2006), Imai and Strauss (2009), and Manski (2004, 2009)
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of reasons. We might emulate the norms of high status people to signal high status (Veblen
1899, Pesendorfer 1995). We might conform to customs due to social penalties for noncompliance
(Akerlof 1980). We might follow a subgroup norm to signal horizontal type (Levy 1959, Wernerfelt
1990) or because of intrinsic utility from conforming to an identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
We might conform to a norm of prosocial behavior to signal benevolent underlying preferences
(Bernheim 1994) or to otherwise receive social acclaim (Becker 1974). Finally, we might follow
others because their choices are informative when we have imperfect information (Banerjee 1992).
The explanations for conformity depend most importantly on whether the action taken is observed
or unobserved and whether we are considering consumption of private goods or private provision
of public goods.
There are three pathways through which information on neighbors electricity consumption
would most likely a¤ect a households quantity of electricity demanded. First, the Reports could
induce households to conserve if individuals derive utility from being shown to be more frugal than
their neighbors. Second, because some externalities, primarily from power plant greenhouse gas
emissions, are not internalized in electricity prices, many consumers perceive that energy conser-
vation helps provide a public good (more moderate global climate). A literature on "conditional
cooperation," including Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman (2008), Axelrod (1984), Cial-
dini (2003), Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001), Frey and Meier (2004), and Shang and Croson
(2004), has shown that people are more likely to contribute to public goods when informed that
others are contributing.
Third, the information in the Home Energy Reports may facilitate social learning, as in Conley
and Udry (Forthcoming), Duo and Saez (2002, 2003), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Mobius,
Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2005), and other applications. Electricity costs the average household
about $1000 per year, but households may not be very knowledgeable about the amount of electricity
they consume or what factors inuence consumption. Given this uncertainty, new information on
neighborsconsumption might induce the household to re-optimize around the level of household
energy services or the e¢ ciency with which energy input is transformed into energy services. For
example, a household that learns that comparable households are using much less energy might
infer that they themselves have low-cost opportunities to conserve.
All of these channels suggest that revealing the social norm should a¤ect high consumption
households more than low consumption households. Importantly, the second and third channels
suggest that learning that they consume less than normal would induce low consumption households
to conserve less. This has been called the "boomerang e¤ect" (Clee and Wicklund 1980, Ringold
2002). In a pilot study of electricity conservation that inuenced the design of OPOWERs Home
Energy Reports, Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, and Griskevicius (2007) found that revealing
the social norm did indeed cause low consumption households to increase consumption. Their
solution was to add "injunctive social norms," which label othersbehavior as good or bad, along
with the "descriptive social norms," which simply describe othersbehavior.
There is also a large body of existing work on how information provision and behavioral interven-
tions can induce households to conserve energy. Giving consumers feedback on their consumption,
providing information on energy savings opportunities, comparing their use to their neighborsuse,
facilitating public or private goal setting, and structuring commitment devices have caused house-
holds to reduce energy consumption by 5-20 percent. Abrahamse, et al, (2005), Darby (2006),
Fischer (2008), Shippee (1980), and Stern (1992) provide reviews of this literature. Many of these
approaches, however, have been tested only in the lab, or in eld experiments with small or un-
representative groups. Furthermore, even if e¤ective in eld experiments, many of these academic
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interventions have been too labor-intensive to be used as a large-scale energy e¢ ciency program.
OPOWER intentionally designed its pilot programs to exploit this existing body of knowledge.
While the randomization into treatment and control will allow an unbiased estimate of the overall
e¤ect of the Reports, because the entire Treatment group received the social comparisons, historical
consumption information, and energy e¢ ciency tips, it will not be possible to determine what aspect
of the Reports drives that treatment e¤ect. As in Benartzi and Thaler (2004), I can evaluate the
overall e¢ cacy of the program motivated by behavioral science, but I cannot test more rened
hypotheses about the channels through which the program works. Although popular media outlets
have concluded it is the peer comparison feedback in particular that reduces householdselectricity
usage, the treatment arms of the pilot program itself provide no evidence that this is actually true.
Whats interesting about the OPOWER pilot experiments is that they take an existing body of
scientic knowledge and test whether they are e¤ective at scale, in a natural eld experiment in
the general population.
2.2 Experimental Design
As of October 2009, OPOWER is operating pilot projects for utilities in California, Minnesota,
Washington, Illinois, Colorado, and Virginia. This paper evaluates their program at an electric
utility called Connexus Energy, which serves customers in seven counties in central Minnesota near
Minneapolis and St. Paul7. Minnosotas New Generation Energy Act of 2007 requires that utilities
run conservation programs that reduce energy demand by 1.5 percent each year. Although in many
states, utilities have little nancial incentive to reduce their own sales, such Energy E¢ ciency
Resource Standards have been the primary reason why utilities have contracted with OPOWER.
Connexus Energy has approximately 96,000 households in its service territory. The households
eligible for the Connexus Energy pilot experiments were those with a full one year of electricity bill
history as of January 2009, as historical consumption data were required to construct the social
comparisons. From the 78,492 eligible households, approximately half (39,217) were randomized
into a Treatment group, which would receive Home Energy Reports, and the rest were randomized
into a Control group, which would not. Some utility sta¤were automatically enrolled in the reports
and are therefore excluded from the analysis. The experiments are still ongoing.
The Reports are several-page letters with two key components. The rst, which is illustrated
in Figure 9.1 and appears at the top of the letters rst page, is the Social Comparison Module.
This compares the households electricity consumption over the past twelve months to the mean of
its comparison group and the 20th percentile. In an attempt to address the potential boomerang
e¤ect, the "E¢ ciency Standing" on the right side of the Social Comparison Module adds injunctive
messages: it labels low- and moderate-consumption households as "Great" and "Good" and adds
"smiley face" emoticons.
The Reports second key component is the Action Steps Module. As illustrated in Figure 9.2,
this suggests both changes to the households stock of energy-using durable goods and to the use
of that capital stock. These suggestions are targeted to di¤erent households based on historical
energy use patterns and demographic characteristics. For example, households whose energy use
was relatively high the previous summer were more likely to receive suggestions to purchase new
energy e¢ cient air conditioners.
7Positive Energy carries out internal statistical evaluations, and independent evaluations of their pilot programs
in Puget Sound and Sacramento are carried out by Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009) and Violette, Provencher, and
Klos (2009).
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The mechanics of the billing and report mailing process are as follows. The utility sends a worker
to read each households electricity meter approximately once per month, records the consumption
over the period, and sends the consumer its monthly bill. Meanwhile, the meter readings are sent
electronically to OPOWER, where each households social comparison is computed. The Home
Energy Report is printed by an outside contractor, send via U.S. Mail, and at some point is opened
at the household. The time between meter reading and the arrival of the Report is typically about
three weeks. For almost all households, the rst round of Reports were constructed after each
households meter reading in January 2009, although a small handful of households were randomized
into Treatment and Control groups over the next few months. Sixty percent of Treatment group
households were randomly assigned to receive the letters after every monthly meter reading, while
40 percent received them only once a quarter8.
2.3 Data and Baseline Characteristics
I observe the 1,540,403 electricity bills for all Treatment and Control households between January
2008 and August 2009, including the date of meter reading and consumption between that reading
and the previous. I also observe OPOWERs social comparison information for every household,
including whether they were rated as "Below Average," "Good," or "Great," and how far they
were from the cuto¤s to be in each of the other categories. I observe both the social comparisons
that the Treatment group did receive and what the Control group would have received. For each
billing period, I also observe the number of Heating Degree-Days or Cooling Degree-Days, which are
correlated with the amount of electricity that should be required to keep a house at a comfortable
temperature9.
Table 8.1 displays the baseline observable characteristics for the Treatment and Control group.
Baseline Usage, which is the average across all meter reads in 2008, is 27.7 kilowatt-hours per day
for both the Treatment and Control groups. For households ever in the "Great," "Good," or "Below
Average" groups, average Baseline Usage is 16.5, 25.0, and 40.7 kilowatt-hours per day, respectively.
Although the household sizes are similar by construction, the "Great" group is poorer, has fewer
household members, and has houses that are worth less.
For context, consider that a medium-sized (75 watt) lightbulb used four hours each day consumes
0.3 kilowatt-hours. A typical window air conditioner running at its highest setting for ve hours
uses 5 kilowatt-hours. As illustrated in Figure 9.3, heating and cooling are the primary uses
of household electricity in the United States: over half of annual electricity consumption is for
refrigerators, air conditioners, and space and water heating. In the most recent available data,
8Two other variations in the treatment should be noted. After the second Report, the normative messaging was
made more "Gentle" for a randomly selected half of the Treatment group. In the "Gentle" condition, the "Below
Average" e¢ ciency group no longer saw that there were "Great" and "Good" categories; they instead simply see
the message that "You used more than average - Turn the report over to nd ways to save." Positive Energy also
experimented with sending di¤erent envelope types. Because the di¤erent envelope types and "Gentle" treatment do
not have sharp economic interpretation, and because the estimated e¤ects of these treatments are not substantially
di¤erent, the treatment e¤ects presented in this paper combine the di¤erent envelopes and the Gentle and non-Gentle
treatments into one Average Treatment E¤ect.
9More precisely, Heating Degree-Days is the sum, over all of the days in the billing period, of the maximum of
zero and the di¤erence between the days average temperature and 65 degrees. A day with average temperature 95
has 30 HDDs, while a day with average temperature 60 has zero HDDs. Cooling Degree-Days is the sum, over all
the days in the billing period, of the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between 65 degrees and the days average
temperature. A day with average temperature 95 has zero CDDs, while a day with average temperature 60 has ve
CDDs.
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computers, televisions, and lighting combined account for only 15 percent of electricity use (US
Energy Information Administration 2001).
Connexus has provided demographic data for each account number in the dataset10, including
characteristics of the house (Age, an indicator for Gas Heat, Value, an indicator for Rental, Single
Family, and Square Footage) and of the occupants (Age of household head, Household Size, and
Income). On Baseline Usage, as well as on all other observable characteristics, the Treatment and
Control groups are strikingly well-balanced. One of the ten baseline characteristics, the age of
the head of household, is statistically di¤erent with 90% condence; the Treatment and Control
averages di¤er by less than 0.2 years. As would be expected in a randomized experiment, an F test
fails to reject that the two groups are identical on observables.
2.4 Attrition
The pilot program experienced two forms of attrition, account closure and opting out. Consumers
close accounts when they move to a di¤erent house; 1.25 and 1.24 percent of Treatment and Control
households, respectively, close accounts during the rst six months of 2009. Households that close
accounts tend to be younger, use less electricity, and have lower incomes, but are statistically
indistinguishable on other observed characteristics. There is no statistical di¤erence between the
Treatment and Control groups in either the rate of account closure or the correlations between
account closure and observable characteristics. The accounts that closed after Treatment began
are included in the base specications during the period when their consumption is observed,
although excluding them has no discernible inuence on the results.
The second form of attrition is by households that asked to opt out of receiving the Home Energy
Reports. In the rst six months of 2009, 247 households (0.6 percent of the Treatment group)
opted out, likely because they perceived the reports as undesired junk mail. These consumers are
statistically di¤erent: they are slightly older, have lower incomes, use less electricity, and are less
likely to live in single family homes. Although they opted out of receiving Reports, their electricity
bills are still observed.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Average Treatment E¤ects
This section details the straightforward approach to estimate the Population Average Treatment
E¤ect of the Home Energy Reports in the population of eligible households. Simply put, the
preferred specication will estimate energy consumption as a function of whether the household is
assigned to treatment, conditional on other controls, after removing household xed e¤ects.
To arrive at that specication, I begin with the standard Rubin Causal Model (Rubin 1974,
Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Each household i has two potential outcomes for the energy con-
sumption outcome for the meter read t: one if it were assigned to the Treatment group (Ti = 1)
and one if it were assigned to the Control (Ti = 0). Of course, only one of those outcomes can
actually be observed:
10Any missing observations were imputed using conditional mean imputation.
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Yit = Yit(Ti) = Yit(0)(1  Ti) + Yit(1)(Ti) =

Yit(0) if Ti = 0
Yit(1) if Ti = 1

(1)
The quantity of interest is the Average Treatment E¤ect,  = E[Yit(1) Yit(0)]. The "treatment"
here is dened as "being mailed the Home Energy Reports or actively opting out." As discussed
above, some Treatment households opted out, so the treatment is not simply "being mailed the
Home Energy Reports." An alternative potential estimand would be the Intent-to-Treat (ITT)
E¤ect of being sent the Report, for the population that did not opt out; this is simply my ATE
divided by the fraction of the population that did not opt out. Since that fraction is very close to
1, the ATE and ITT E¤ect di¤er only by a negligible amount. The treatment is also not "opening
Home Energy Reports." It is di¢ cult to measure letter open rates, and thus it would be di¢ cult
to estimate that second form of ITT E¤ect.
I dene the treatment e¤ect in this way because it is a useful estimand from a policy perspective.
OPOWER, and the utilities that contract with them and policymakers that regulate them, want
to know the aggregate electricity conservation possible from applying the program to a population.
For the population from which the experimental households were drawn, this quantity of interest
can be derived simply by multiplying the ATE by the population size11.
Each household has a di¤erent meter reading schedule. Let t 2 ftmin; :::; tmaxg = f 12; 11; :::; 0; 1; 2; :::g
index bill numbers beginning one year before the treatment began; for each household, each bill
number is associated with a particular day, month, and year. Most of the rst set of Reports were
sent in mid-January, immediately after a meter read at time ti0. As I will show, little substantive
or statistical e¤ect is observed until the second meter reading after the January round. All meter
reads t more than 40 days after ti0, which for nearly all households is simply the second subsequent
monthly meter read, are therefore considered "post-treatment."
The variable Pit is a post-treatment indicator variable for household is meter reading at date t.
Denote by Yit the average daily electricity consumption for period ending at t. So that this can later
be interpreted as a percentage change, the variable is normalized by control group consumption
in the post-period. The variable Qi denotes whether household i was assigned to the Quarterly
group, in either Treatment or Control state. Random assignment to Treatment and Control implies
that unobservable factors "it that inuence electricity consumption are uncorrelated with T and Q.
This allows an unbiased estimate of the ATE for both the Monthly and Quarterly Groups with the
following equation:
Yit = ( + QQi)  TiPit +   Pit + my + i + "it (2)
This specication includes month-by-year dummy variables my and household xed e¤ects i;
alternative arrangements of xed e¤ects and controls will also be presented. This is estimated
in OLS using the standard xed e¤ects estimator, using Huber-White ("robust") standard errors,
clustered by household. As discussed by Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004), these standard
errors are consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern in the errors "it within household
over time.
11To determine cost-e¤ectiveness, the cost estimates must be adjusted to account for the fact that some households
will opt out.
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3.2 Decay of E¤ects in Quarterly Group
After estimating the Average Treatment E¤ects, I move to an empirical test of whether these e¤ects
decay in the Quarterly group over the three bills observed in each quarter. Intuitively, we would
like to test whether the Quarterly group conserves more on the rst and second bills after receiving
a Report (the second and third bills after the one on which the report was based) compared to
on the third bill of the quarter. This must control for bill-to-bill (i.e. month-to-month) variation
in the average treatment e¤ect in the Monthly group, which could be driven by seasonal weather
changes. I estimate the following equation:
Yit = QiTiPit  (Q12B12it + Q) +
tmaxX
b=tmin
1(t = b)  f1bTi + 2bg+ i + "it (3)
The variable B12it is an indicator for whether bill t is the rst or second bill after receiving a
Report. The rst term compares the treatment e¤ects Q12 in the Quarterly group when B12it = 1
to the baseline quarterly treatment e¤ect Q. If the treatment e¤ects decay, Q12 will be more
strongly negative (or less positive) than Q. The second term of the equation controls for underlying
treatment e¤ects and consumption levels for each bill number, ranging from tmin =  12 at the
beginning of the data to the most recent bill observation tmax.
4 Results
4.1 Treatment E¤ects
Table 8.2 presents the estimates of the Average Treatment E¤ect in the eligible population. The top
row is the ATE for the Monthly group, while the second row is the di¤erence between that and the
Quarterly group ATE. The rst specication is the simple unconditional di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimator. The latter four primary specications include di¤erent congurations of xed e¤ects,
month-by-year dummies, and weather controls; specication III is the exact specication detailed in
the Empirical Strategy section. The point estimates of ATEs center around negative 1.9-2.0 percent
and 1.5 percent for the Monthly and Quarterly treatments, respectively, and are not statistically
di¤erent between the ve specications.
Table 8.3 displays two "alternative approaches" to evaluating these pilot programs. The rst two
columns reect the approach that would need to be taken if the program did not have a randomized
experimental control group. These specications use only the Treatment group data and implement
a di¤erence estimator to estimate the treatment e¤ect. The rst column is a simple before-after
comparison, without accounting for weather or season, and the results are not encouraging: b
di¤ers from the experimental estimate by almost an order of magnitude. After including fourth-
order polynomials in Heating and Cooling Degree-Days and 12 month-of-year dummies in the
second column, however, the estimated treatment e¤ect is -2.53 percent. This is comparable to
but still statistically di¤erent from the experimentally-estimated e¤ect with more than 95 percent
condence.
Perhaps the clearest way to emphasize the possible bias from time-varying unobservables is to
replicate this regression with the Control group only. In this placebo regression, we expect to see
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no e¤ects of the treatment. The third column of table 8.3 shows that we estimate a statistically-
signicant treatment e¤ect on the control group of -0.57 percent. These results underscore the
importance of randomized experimentation when results must be measured with precision. Related
to the discussion of Lalonde (1986) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999), however, the approximate
similarity of the experimental and non-experimental results does suggest that observable time and
weather covariates are useful in this setting in controlling for e¤ects on the outcome variable that
may be correlated with treatment.
The fourth specication in Table 8.3 presents a cautionary tale about using the logarithmic
function. It replicates Specication III from Table 8.2, except after logging the dependent variable.
In principle, both coe¢ cients are interpreted as percents and should be comparable. In practice,
the estimated Monthly and Quarterly ATEs in the log specication are 36 and 23 percent lower,
respectively, than in the comparable specication in levels. This di¤erence is both economically
signicant, in that it would make a noticeable di¤erence in the estimated cost e¤ectiveness, and
statistically signicant. This di¤erence between the percentage ATEs in logs and levels is relatively
constant across (unreported) di¤erent specications, and it is not driven by the 307 observations
of the dependent variable that are equal to zero.
Intuitively, this di¤erence is driven by Jensens Inequality. The treatment e¤ect of interest is
the average reduction in kilowatt-hours resulting from the program. The percent changes reported
in Table 8.2 are that quantity, normalized by Control group consumption in the post-treatment
period to generate a percent change. The log specication is fundamentally di¤erent: it is the
average of the percent reductions across households, instead of the percent of baseline that the
average reduction represents. It turns out that the percentage treatment e¤ect is larger (in absolute
value) for households with higher consumption, and substantially higher for the most consumptive
households. Taking the log of the households consumption, and then taking the average across
households, understates the ATE (in absolute value) relative to taking the average change in level
across households and then normalizing into a percent.
4.2 Decay of E¤ects in Quarterly Group
Figure 9.4 illustrates the estimated Average Treatment E¤ect on meter reads over time, separately
for the households receiving quarterly and monthly reports. The omitted meter read, number 0, is
the meter reading ti0 upon which the rst reports were based, which was in January or the rst few
days of February. For the 12 reads before that, the treatment and control group consumption levels
are substantively and statistically identical. This is still the case on the rst meter read after ti0.
By the second meter read, however, there is a noticeable Average Treatment E¤ect. That a¤ect
grew between February and August, perhaps both because the response to the Reports may grow
in the early phases of the program and because the e¤ects may be stronger in the summer months.
Although the standard errors are wide, the gure suggests that the Quarterly groups ATE is
higher in month 2, the rst meter read where we would expect to see e¤ects from a Report generated
from the month 0 meter read, and then decays in months 3 and 4. A second quarterly report was
generated from meter read number 3, and the Quarterly groups treatment e¤ect again increases
(in absolute value) in months 5 and 6. The point estimate then decreases again in absolute value
in month 7.
Table 8.4 presents the formal econometric test, described in the Empirical Strategy section, of
whether the e¤ects are stronger for the rst two meter reads after receiving a Report (2, 3, 5, and
6) relative to the third (meter reads 4 and 7). Specication I includes separate dummies for the
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rst (and second) bill after receiving the report, which on the graph are reads 2 and 5 (and 3 and
6). Specication II is identical to Specication I except that it combines the dummy variables for
the rst and second bills.
In this latter specication, the e¤ect of a Quarterly Report relative to the Monthly Report for
the rst or second bill after the report arrives is -0.15%. The baseline Quarterly variable, which
captures the relative e¤ect in the third bill of the quarter, is 0.56%. This is a di¤erence of 0.71%,
which is economically substantial: it is nearly half of the Quarterly groups treatment e¤ect. The
results for Specication I similarly show that the ATEs for the rst and second bills after receiving
a Report are stronger than the e¤ect in the third bill of the quarter; they are di¤erent with better
than 95 percent condence in a two-sided test.
Three factors could explain this result. First, the information contained in the Reports - or
gathered in response to the Reports - has value that varies by season. OPOWER targets a set of
between 100 and 200 tips to households, and while some have e¤ects that would vary negligibly by
season ("Buy an energy e¢ cient refrigerator"), others are capital stock or usage changes that are
fundamentally seasonal ("Replace your heater" or "Cover your pool"). Second, perceiving oneself
as a "frugal" consumer of energy could enter consumersutility functions directly, and one could
model that the marginal utility of conservation could depend on how recently a Report arrived.
Third, the Reports could remind households of opportunities that they already knew about to
conserve energy, and that reminder e¤ect could decay over time due to bounded attention.
OPOWER has collected surveys of the treatment group in one of their pilot programs that
provide some further evidence on this issue. Treatment group households were asked to self report
what they had changed as a result of receiving the Home Energy Reports. Some of the reported
e¤ects were indeed seasonal changes to household capital stock, including weather-stripping win-
dows, improving insulation, or servicing the air conditioner. Many of the most frequently reported
changes, however, were day-to-day usage behaviors: turning o¤ lights, unplugging electronics, ad-
justing thermostats, and closing window blinds. Importantly, these behaviors are activities that
most consumers likely already knew could save them energy12.
With these data, it is not possible to denitively parse out the information and attention
explanations. If day-to-day behavior changes constitute a substantial portion of the treatment
e¤ects, however, it is more likely that the decays in the Quarterly group ATEs are part of a cycle
in which the Reports remind or motivate households to conserve, and this attention decays over
time.
4.3 E¤ects as a Function of Baseline Usage
Figure 9.5 illustrates the treatment e¤ects by deciles of the distribution of baseline usage, again
normalized by Control group average consumption in the post-treatment period. These e¤ects
range from almost zero for the bottom two deciles of baseline usage to 6.4 percent in the top ten
percent. In general, the more electricity a household used before the treatment, the more that
it conserved post-treatment. This could be because the most consumptive households had low-
cost energy conservation opportunities, and the tips contained in the Reports made them aware
of this. This result is also consistent with the "boomerang e¤ect" model, under which previously
12OPOWER is gathering further evidence on both information and behaviors using an improved survey of both
treatment and control groups, and these results can be formally presented in the next revision of this paper to
strengthen this argument.
12
low-consumption households might not conserve - or might even consume more - after receiving
information that they are less consumptive than their peers.
Some readers may have noticed that the design of the normative categorizations could allow the
use of a Regression Discontinuity design to estimate their causal relative e¤ects. Those households
just below the cuto¤ between being categorized "Good" and "Great" are in the limit identical to
those households just above, but they received di¤erent normative categorizations. This provides
a natural experiment that could allow the estimation of the relative e¤ects, for households near
the cuto¤, of being in the three di¤erent categorizations. In practice, the Regression Discontinuity
estimator does not o¤er enough power to either estimate a statistically signicant e¤ect of the
categorizations or to compute a "tightly-estimated zero" by rejecting reasonably small hypothesized
e¤ects. See Appendix 7.1 for more details.
5 Proling and Cost E¤ectiveness
Regardless of the mechanism that drives the variation in treatment e¤ects across households with
di¤erent baseline usage, the heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects as a function of an observable charac-
teristic suggests that there could be substantial gains from targeting the program towards the most
responsive households. Furthermore, because we observe a larger set of household characteristics
that might be correlated with the treatment e¤ect, a more comprehensive approach to "proling"
could be useful. My approach builds on the literature detailing the use of existing information
on heterogeneous treatment e¤ects to allocate future treatments. This literature dates to Walds
(1950) work on statistical decision theory and has grown recently with work by Berger, Black, and
Smith (2000), Dehejia (2005), Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2009), Hirano and Porter (2006), Imai
and Strauss (2009), and Manski (2004, 2009).
Compared to much of the recent literature, the present problem is straightforward, as the
objective function will be unambiguous and the decisionmaker can be modeled as risk-neutral. I
focus on perhaps the simplest case of proling: the OPOWER program is to be allocated to a
given proportion of the population, and we want to target the program such as obtain the largest
expected treatment e¤ect13 conditional on the information from a previous randomized trial. The
decision variable is which subset of its customer population, dened by observable characteristics,
will be assigned to treatment.
The constraint of targeting less than the entire population could arise because the electric utility
has limited resources to treat its entire customer base. It could also arise if the Energy E¢ ciency
13While we would in principle want to maximize welfare, the utility in practice minimizes cost from its own
perspective, with no consideration for the change in consumer welfare. Given that costs are constant across individuals,
minimizing the cost of achieving a given reduction is equivalent to maximizing the expected treatment e¤ect of
treating a given number of people. In designing this system, regulators presumably hope that the solutions to the
cost minimization and welfare maximization problems are similar. One example of why this distinction can be
important is the case of rebates for energy e¢ cient appliances. If these rebates are entirely inframarginal (an example
of what energy industry analysts call the "free rider problem," not to be confused with the traditional free rider
problem in the provision of public goods), their cost e¤ectiveness would be innite. Given that inframarginal rebates
are simply transfers, the e¢ ciency losses in the simplest model would be zero.
In practice, and in this analysis in particular, this simplication must be made because while it is easy to observe
electricity consumption, it would be quite costly to observe the actions that households take in response to the
Reports. It is possible, for example, that the Reports induce some households to buy more energy e¢ cient lightbulbs
or appliances. Since the change in treatment group demand for these other goods is unobserved, we cannot compute
welfare. This concern is quite general in evaluating energy e¢ ciency programs; one resulting benet here is that
focusing on cost e¤ectiveness keeps this analysis consistent with a previous body of work.
13
Resource Standard, the state regulation requiring a given amount of energy conservation relative
to baseline, could be satised by treating only a portion of the population with the Home Energy
Reports. As discussed earlier, state-level Energy E¢ ciency Resource Standards are the primary
reason why utilities contract with OPOWER to reduce the demand for their product.
The decisionmaker seeks a statistical treatment rule  : X  ! f0; 1g that maps individuals
with characteristics X to the treated or control states for a future OPOWER program. Denote by
 the space of possible treatment rules. The scalar i = (Xi) 2 f0; 1g is the choice of treatment
for individual i with characteristics Xi. The decisionmaker has information  from the existing
randomized experiment in a representative sample of larger population P. Recall that, as dened
earlier in the paper, the heterogeneous Conditional Average Treatment E¤ect (Xi) is typically
less than zero, meaning that we wish to assign treatment to units with expected treatment e¤ects
that are more negative.
The utilitys objective is to maximize the expected (negative) treatment e¤ect conditional on
the information from the past experiment, given that they are to treat H households from the
population:
max
2
E
"X
i2P
 (Xi)  ij
#
s:t:
X
i2P
i = H (4)
Imagine ordering the households in the population by expected treatment e¤ect conditional on
their Xi. Denote by R the Hth-strongest expected treatment e¤ect. Given the assumption of
no spillovers between treatment units, the optimal statistical decision rule collapses to assigning
OPOWER treatment to the H households with expected treatment e¤ects more negative than R:
i = 1 (E [ (Xi)j]   R) = 1

 \(Xi)   R

(5)
While recent related applications such as Dehejia (2005) and Imai and Strauss (2009) have used
Bayesian estimators to construct a distribution of possible outcomes, I use the frequentist approach
more familiar to program evaluation in economics. As suggested in the rst line of the above
equation, I use the heterogeneous Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects estimated in OLS, \ i(Xi)
to construct E [(Xi)j]. A remaining challenge is to determine which conditioning variables will
be used to estimate the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and to assign future treatment. Including
a large set of conditioning variables could allow treatment to be targeted at smaller subgroups that
might have particularly large treatment e¤ects. In a nite sample, however, including a larger set
of covariates increases the likelihood of overtting, which could cause the program to be targeted
at groups that idiosyncratically appeared to have large treatment e¤ects only in the experimental
data.
Appendix 7.2 details a procedure, based on the work of Imai and Strauss (2009), to determine
the optimal set of conditioning variables Z. I rst dene the set of possible conditioning variables
Z, which are the observed demographics X plus all interactions and squares of the continuous
demographic variables. I then place these potential conditioning variables in order of "prescriptive-
ness," which refers to the amount by which conditioning on each individual increases the expected
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ATE of a future program. Third, I use cross-validation to generate out-of-sample predictions of
the expected ATE while adding progressively less-prescriptive variables to the set of conditioning
variables. Fourth, I select the set of conditioning variables that has the largest expected ATE.
This procedure indicates that the optimal set of conditioning variables in this application Z
actually has only one element: the households pre-program baseline electricity usage. Conditioning
on additional variables causes the model to overt, reducing the future expected ATE.
5.1 Proling and Cost E¤ectiveness: Results
Table 8.5 presents the results of heterogeneous treatment e¤ects regressions for the entire sample,
as in Step 2a. The covariates are normalized to mean zero, standard deviation 1, meaning that a
one standard deviation increase in Baseline Usage is associated with an increase in the ATE (in
absolute value) of 1.73 to 2.12 percentage points. The rst specication interacts the treatment
indicator with the optimal Z, the baseline consumption variable.
The second and third regressions represent two alternative "rules of thumb" or selecting pre-
scriptive variables. The second column interacts the treatment indicator variable with all ten
available demographic characteristics. Conditional on the other interactions, houses with gas heat
have higher treatment e¤ects in absolute value, while houses with larger square footage have lower
treatment e¤ects. No other observable characteristics are statistically signicantly associated with
the strength of the treatment e¤ect. The third column interacts the treatment indicator only with
the three characteristics on which the treatment e¤ect varies with 95 percent condence in the rst
specication. The nal column is simply the homogeneous treatment e¤ect estimation, where the
treatment e¤ect represents the combination of Monthly and Quarterly treatment arms.
Table 8.6 presents the expected ATEs e(Z(X)) when treatment is assigned to one half of
the population based on three sets of conditioning variables Z: the optimal set Z and two "rule
of thumb" conditioning procedures. These ATEs, which pool the e¤ects from the Quarterly and
Monthly groups and are computed via the cross validation procedure discussed in Appendix 7.2, are
compared to assigning to treatment the entire population or a randomly selected sample thereof.
The table shows that proling doubles the ATE for the treated half of the population. This is
remarkable: energy e¢ ciency programs, as well as job training programs, health interventions,
and any number of other programs, devote continual e¤ort to incrementally improve their e¢ cacy.
These results show that proling can immediately double the expected average impact.
Interestingly, the expected treatment e¤ects on the treated populations are very similar across
the three proling procedures. In this particular application, the "rules of thumb" for determining
covariates on which to condition assignment are nearly as useful as the optimal rule.
The tables second row displays the average annual electricity bill savings for the treated group
under the four di¤erent assignment mechanisms, based on Connexus Energys average residential
electricity price14. The average household saves $18 per year on electricity bills as a result of the
changes caused by being sent monthly Home Energy Reports.
Using the ATE for the program to date and an estimate of cost per letter sent, I nd that
the cost e¤ectiveness of the existing Connexus program is 5.25 cents per kilowatt-hour saved.
This compares reasonably well to recent point estimates of the average cost of other utility energy
e¢ ciency programs, which range from 4.7 to 13.3 cents per kilowatt-hour in a study by Au¤hammer,
14This is available from http://www.connexusenergy.com/resrates.htm.
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Blumstein, and Fowlie (2008)15 and from 1.6 to 3.3 cents per kilowatt-hour in a study by Friedrich,
et al, (2009)16. As shown in Table 8.6, using proling to target treatment at the most responsive
half of the population would cut the cost per kilowatt-hour in half, to 2.68 cents-kilowatt-hour17.
The reader should bear in mind that the ATE, and therefore the cost e¤ectiveness, could vary
substantially across utilities and geographic areas, by electricity demand, as determined by season
and the mildness of the weather, and as a function of the duration the program has been in e¤ect.
For a nationwide rollout of the Home Energy Reports, Allcott and Mullainathan (2009a, 2009b)
calculate a somewhat better cost e¤ectiveness, given that program costs would be lower at scale.
Some utilities also report that the program a¤ects customer satisfaction, an additional e¤ect that
this calculation does not consider. Finally, it is important to re-emphasize that we do not observe
how the program changes householdschoice of energy services such as comfort from heating and
cooling, nor do we observe how their expenditures change for energy-using goods. As a result, we
can say little about the welfare e¤ects of the intervention.
6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the e¤ects of the OPOWER Home Energy Reports, which give households
feedback on past energy consumption, compare them to their neighbors, and provide energy conser-
vation tips. The program is a remarkable departure from traditional energy e¢ ciency programs in
that it is designed with direct insight from behavioral science and is implemented using randomized
controlled trials. The perceived success or failure of these pilot programs will directly a¤ect mil-
lions of dollars of future investment and will more generally inuence how future energy e¢ ciency
programs are designed and evaluated.
I nd that the Average Treatment E¤ect in the population of eligible Minnesota households is
between 1.9 and 2.0 percent below baseline. In the group receiving quarterly Reports, his e¤ect
decays somewhat in the months between Reports, either because the information decays seasonally
or because the attentional e¤ects of a Report decay over time. I also show that the interventions
e¤ects are strongest for households that have highest baseline consumption. This is consistent with
(but not causal evidence of) a "boomerang e¤ect" in which learning the social norm can fail to
motivate households with low baseline consumption or even cause them to increase consumption.
Although the OPOWER experiment was carried out in a specic domain and requires a general-
interest reader to digest some institutional detail, this analysis has two important and generalizable
economic implications. First, the analysis adds to a recently-growing appreciation of how "prol-
ing," the targeting of social programs with heterogeneous treatment e¤ects toward individuals with
high expected e¤ects, can improve a programs welfare implications. If a utility were limited to
15 I write point estimate because there are various forms of uncertainty around this comparison, including not
just the statistical uncertainty in the point estimate conditional on the data, but also uncertainties such as regarding
the durability of energy savings, the generalizability across di¤erent regions, and the quality of the underlying data
used to compute the costs of these other programs.
16The Friedrich, et al, (2009) analysis is based on electric utilitiesestimates of cost e¤ectiveness, which are typically
based on the "deemed savings" measurement approach. Many analysts believe that these estimates could be biased
toward zero.
17Note that this example is not a reasonable basis for an argument to limit the application of the program: given
the low cost of Positive Energys program, even applying the program households where the treatment e¤ect is smaller
than the median can be more cost e¤ective than some existing alternative programs. This does, however, show that if
the program must be limited to some subset of the population due to budget constraints, there are gains to targeting
it towards the most responsive subset.
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implementing the OPOWER program for half of its residential population, I estimate that proling
could make the program twice as cost e¤ective.
Second, this analysis adds to recently-growing appreciation of how non-price interventions can
a¤ect consumer behavior. Economists in general, and energy e¢ ciency program managers in par-
ticular, have historically focused on how prices and subsidies a¤ect demand. The idea that simply
sending a letter - a treatment that has no e¤ect on relative prices and may have limited e¤ects
on information sets - can cause measurable changes in demand is remarkable. From the utilitys
perspective, the cost e¤ectiveness of the OPOWER program compares favorably to the traditional
large subsidies for energy e¢ cient durable goods. Perhaps the most important conclusion, there-
fore, is that some combination of information, attention, and social norms can cause substantive
changes in consumer behavior at population scale.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Regression Discontinuity
In this Appendix, which need not be included for publication, I briey discuss a Regression Discontinuity
specication that could in principle be used to estimate the relative e¤ects of the di¤erent normative cate-
gorizations Social Comparison Module in the Home Energy Reports. These e¤ects should be observed two
meter reads after the meter read upon which the categorization was based.
In keeping with the tradition of graphical analysis of RD designs (Lee and Lemieux 2009, Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009), Figure 9.8 illustrates the treatment groups consumption as a function of distance from
the household-specic comparison groups mean consumption, which is the cuto¤ between being categorized
as "Good" vs. "Below Average." The Usage variable on the y-axis, which as before is normalized by Control
group post-treatment consumption, is residual of degree-day polynomials and month-by-year controls, but
not of household xed e¤ects. The line is upward sloping, as households that consume less compared to
their peers on a given bill also tend to have lower residual usageon future bills. Figure 9.9 is the analogous
illustration near the 20th percentile of the household-specic comparison group, which is the cuto¤ between
being categorized as "Great" vs. "Good."
Whats apparent from both graphs is that the two-sided 95 percent condence interval around any esti-
mated e¤ects at this bandwidth is approximately four percent of Control group post-treatment consumption,
which is more than double the overall ATE from the Reports. Any di¤erences in ATEs from being placed in
one or the other normative category, however, would likely be much smaller. I attempted the RD estimation
including household xed e¤ects and other controls to reduce residual variance, and also added data from
one of OPOWERs other pilot programs. This does not su¢ ciently reduce the variance around the esti-
mated RD treatment e¤ect to estimate a statistically signicant e¤ect of the categorizations or to compute
a "tightly-estimated zero" by rejecting reasonably small hypothesized e¤ects.
7.2 Variable Selection
This Appendix details the procedure for selecting a vector of observables and interactions to condition on
when estimating \ i(Xi) in the proling procedure. The discussion of this problem and my approach to
addressing it draw heavily on previous work by Imai and Strauss (2009) and, somewhat less directly, on
Gunter, Zhu, and Murphy (2007).
While there is a large literature on how to select "predictive" variables that are correlated with the
outcome, there is no consensus on the choice of "prescriptive variables" that help assign units to treatment.
Predictive variables are by denition correlated with the outcome and therefore may be useful for reducing
residual variance, i.e. improving the e¢ ciency of the estimator. However, if a predictive variable has the
same correlation with the outcome in treatment and control, meaning that it is not correlated with the
treatment e¤ect, this variable would not be useful for generating a statistical decision rule.
Most fundamentally, a powerful prescriptive variable is one that increases the e¢ cacy of the targeted
program in a future implementation when proling is conditioned on that variable. Intuitively, one approach
to choosing the set of prescriptive variables is to try conditioning on all possible covariates and subsets thereof,
generating assignment rules based on each potential set of covariates, then running a future program based
on that assignment rule and measuring the e¤ects. Because these theoretical future programs di¤er only
in the rules used to assign treatment, the future program with the highest ATE is the one with the best
assignment rule.
The actual approach is designed to mimic that process, while addressing two concerns. First, we of
course cannot try many di¤erent future implementations. We can, however, mimic that process with the
data from the existing program: we can partition the data, use the "rst" part to generate the treatment
rule and the "second" part to test its e¢ cacy. If we then reverse the partition - use the "second" part to
generate the treatment rule and the "rst part" to test e¢ cacy, we will have then exploited all of the data
available while still cross-validating the assignment mechanism outside of the sample that generated it.
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A second problem with the intuitive approach is that it would be very computationally intensive to try
all possible sets of covariates. Instead, using a procedure developed by Imai and Strauss (2009), we can rank
the individual covariates based on their "prescriptiveness." In this context, "prescriptiveness" means how
much conditioning and assigning based on that one covariate increases the expected treatment e¤ect relative
to random assignment of treatment.
Imagine ordering the variables from most to least prescriptive. Beginning with the most prescriptive
variable, one can progressively add the next-most prescriptive variable to the set of conditioning variables.
Conditioning assignment on additional covariates should for some time increase the future treatment e¤ect
of the future targeted program, but the overtting e¤ect will eventually dominate and the future treatment
e¤ect will decrease. This procedure of sequentially adding variables in order of prescriptiveness ensures that
we have the most prescriptive set of variables at the apparent maximum. This ordering procedure simplies
the problem from one of selecting the optimal set of covariates to selecting the optimal number of covariates.
Because of the ordering, the optimal number will also tell us the optimal set (Imai and Straus 2009).
7.2.1 Specics of the Variable Selection Algorithm
The goal is to select the optimal set of covariates Z, drawn from some set of possible covariates Z, such
that a statistical treatment rule conditioning on Z maximizes the expected treatment e¤ect in a future
implementation of the program. The variables Z are functions of household observable characteristics X.
Denote by Z(X) the treatment rule using variables Z, and denote by e(Z(X)) the expected treatment
e¤ect of a future program using that rule. Consistent with the maximization problem introduced above,
that treatment e¤ect is conditioned on including some set of people such that the minimum treatment e¤ect
is above some threshold R. For simplicity, in this part of the problem, I assume that e(Z(X)) reects the
treatment e¤ect when one-half of the population is to be treated. The maximization problem is:
Z = argmax
Z2Z
E [ e(Z(X))j] (6)
Following Imai and Strauss (2009), I implement a four-step procedure.
Step 1: Dene the possible set of prescriptive variables. In principle, the possible set of
prescriptive variables Z could be all levels of interactions of the 10 observable household characteristics, plus
polynomial series of the continuous variables. To speed computation, I use only the variables themselves,
interactions of each pair, and squares of the continuous variables. This gives a set Z of J = 62 possible
covariates, which are indexed j = 1; :::; J .
Step 2: Order the set of variables by prescriptiveness. In this step, the set of J possible
covariates is ordered by "prescriptiveness": the amount by which conditioning on that one variable Zj
increases the expected future treatment e¤ect e(Zj (X)).
For each of the J possible covariates Zj , the procedure is:
Step 2a: Use the entire dataset to estimate the average treatment e¤ect, combining Monthly and
Quarterly treatment arms, and the amount by which the ATE changes with a change in Zj :
Yit = (0 + 1  Zj)  TiPit +   Pit + my + i + "it (7)
Step 2b: For both the Treatment and Control groups, t each individual is \(Xi) = b0 + b1 Zji from
the above regression.
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Step 2c: Treatment rule Zj (X) assigns treatment to the one-half of households with the most negative
tted treatment e¤ects.
Step 2d: Using the half of the original randomized Treatment and Control groups assigned to treatment
by this potential rule, estimate the treatment e¤ect e(Zj (X)).
After computing these expected average treatment e¤ects for each Zj , these e¤ects are ordered from
the largest negative treatment e¤ect to smallest. This gives a new ordering of the set Z from most to
least prescriptive, such that  e(Zj (X))   e(Zj+1(X));8j. The double solid line in Figure 9.6 illustrates
this ordering for j = 1; :::; 62. The most prescriptive variable is Baseline Usage, followed by interactions of
Baseline usage with the Single Family and Rent indicator variables.
Step 3: Determine the expected ATE for each combination of prescriptive variables.
For each combination of prescriptive variables with e¤ectiveness greater than or equal to that of j, cross
validation is now used to predict the expected treatment e¤ect of proling on that combiation in assigning
treatment for a future program. First, the sample is randomly divided into K = 5 subsets for K-fold cross
validation.
For each value of j from 1 to J , which are now ordered from most to least prescriptive, the procedure is:
Step 3a: Dene Z1;:::;j as the set of variables such that  e(Zl(X))   e(Zj (X)). This set contains
all the variables, including j, that have at least as prescriptive as j. For each of the K cross-validation sets,
estimate the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects equation using the K   1 "training sets" excluding k. In set k,
which is out of sample, then determine the treatment rule kZ1;:::;j (X).
Step 3b: After using cross validation to determine the treatment rule Z1;:::;j (X) for all Treatment and
Contol observations in the data, then use the original randomization into Treatment and Control to estimate
the ATE for those units that would be assigned to treatment, e(Z1;:::;j (X)).
Step 4: Determine the optimal number of variables. The single solid line appearing on the
lower portion of Figure 9.6 illustrates the e(Z1;:::;j (X)) computed via cross validation when proling based
on an increasing number of covariates Z. The optimal set of covariates Z is determined by the point on
that line with the largest (negative) treatment e¤ect:
j = argmax
j
E[ e(Z1;:::;j (X))j] (8)
In this case, the most negative treatment e¤ect is at the far left of Figure 9.6, meaning that j = 1. In
this application, the optimal statistical treatment rule assigns treatment based only on Baseline Usage.
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8 Tables
8.1 Baseline Household Characteristics
Treatment Control T-C Great Good Below Av
Mean: Baseline Usage (kwh/day) 29.74 29.69 0.053 16.52 25.04 40.67
SD (and SE): ( 16.44 ) ( 16.17 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 8.05 ) ( 9.68 ) ( 17.89 )
Consumer Age 49.98 49.82 0.161 52.57 50.05 48.45
( 12.18 ) ( 12.18 ) ( 0.087 )

( 12.99 ) ( 12.34 ) ( 11.38 )
1(Gas Heat) 0.92 0.92 -0.0013 0.94 0.93 0.90
( 0.28 ) ( 0.27 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.30 )
Household Size 2.61 2.62 -0.010 2.23 2.57 2.84
( 1.22 ) ( 1.23 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 1.07 ) ( 1.18 ) ( 1.28 )
House Age 31.57 31.40 0.166 32.07 30.99 31.59
( 28.03 ) ( 27.96 ) ( 0.200 ) ( 28.06 ) ( 27.68 ) ( 28.24 )
House Value 393.9 394.7 -0.792 369.6 385.5 414.5
( 139.4 ) ( 139.4 ) ( 0.995 ) ( 121.7 ) ( 132.6 ) ( 150.6 )
Income (1000s) 86.18 86.19 -0.010 75.59 84.42 92.85
( 37.86 ) ( 37.60 ) ( 0.269 ) ( 33.52 ) ( 36.48 ) ( 39.52 )
1(Rent) 0.022 0.023 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.024
( 0.14 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.15 )
Single Family 0.96 1 -0.001 0.97 0.96 0.95
( 0.21 ) ( 0 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.22 )
Square Footage 1660 1659 1.41 1614 1637 1703
( 454 ) ( 449 ) ( 3.22 ) ( 442 ) ( 441 ) ( 464 )
F-Test p-Value 0.384
1(Account Closed) 0.012 0.013 0.023 0.011 0.010
0.11 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.10
Number of Households 39217 39275 14,055 33,016 30,913
Number of Bill Obs 769299 771083 276,922 650,671 609,982
*, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% condence, respectively.
"Number of Households" by normative categorization reects the number of treatment or control house-
holds that were at any point in that category. The sum of these numbers across the three categories therefore
is greater than the number of households in the experiment.
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8.2 Treatment E¤ects
I II III IV V
T x Post -0.0152 -0.0192 -0.0191 -0.0197 -0.0189
( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0019 )
T x Quarterly x Post -0.0019 0.0045 0.0045 0.0044 0.0043
( 0.0055 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0024 )
Post -0.0919 -0.0841 -0.0453 -0.0870 -0.0058
( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0050 ) ( 0.0058 )
Degree-Day Polynomial Yes
Month x Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
House Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
House x Month Fixed E¤ects Yes
Observations (thousands) 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540
R2 0.0041 0.0041 0.0453 0.0000 0.0485
F Statistic 4159 4284 7053 3391 3018
*, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% condence, respectively.
Dependent variable is the households average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized
by average control group consumption in the Post period.
8.3 Alternative Empirical Approaches
Treatment Only Treatment Only Control Only In Logs
T x Post -0.0122
( 0.0016 )
T x Quarterly x Post 0.0009
( 0.0021 )
Post -0.1033 -0.0253 -0.0057 -0.0430
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0039 )
Quarterly x Post 0.0045 0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0373
( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0009 )
Degree-Day Polynomial Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes
Month x Year Dummies Yes
House Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (thousands) 769 769 771 1540
R2 0.0047 0.0479 0.0484 0.0553
F Statistic 3675 1249 1252 13362
*, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% condence, respectively.
Dependent variable for the rst three specications is the households average daily electricity consump-
tion (kilowatt-hours), normalized by average control group consumption in the Post period. For the fourth
specication, it is the log of that value.
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8.4 Decay of Quarterly Treatment E¤ects
I II
T x Quarterly x Post 0.0056 0.0056
( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0034 )
T x Quarterly x Post (1st Bill) -0.0009
( 0.0032 )
T x Quarterly x Post (2nd Bill) -0.0021
( 0.0024 )
T x Quarterly x Post (1st or Second Bill) -0.0015
( 0.0025 )
Degree-Day Polynomial
T x Bill Number Dummies Yes Yes
Bill Number Dummies Yes Yes
House Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Observations (thousands) 1,456 1,540
R2 0.0431 0.0431
F Statistic 3795 3883
*, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% condence, respectively.
Dependent variable is the households average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized
by average control group consumption in the Post period.
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8.5 Heterogeneous Treatment E¤ects
I II III IV
T x Post -0.0172 -0.0168 -0.0172 -0.0173
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0016 )
T x Post x Baseline Usage -0.0173 -0.0212 -0.0209
( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0038 )
T x Post x Consumer Age -0.0018
( 0.0015 )
T x Post x Gas Heat -0.0063 -0.0061
( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0024 )
T x Post x Household Size 0.0020
( 0.0017 )
T x Post x House Age 0.0004
( 0.0016 )
T x Post x log(House Value) -0.0012
( 0.0015 )
T x Post x log(Income) -0.0009
( 0.0019 )
T x Post x 1(Rent) -0.0006
( 0.0014 )
T x Post x Single Family -0.0003
( 0.0013 )
T x Post x Square Footage 0.0053 0.0043
( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0017 )
Post -0.0470 -0.0438 -0.0447 -0.0453
( 0.0060 ) ( 0.0060 ) ( 0.0060 ) ( 0.0058 )
Month x Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
House Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post x (X Variable) Controls Yes Yes Yes -
Observations (thousands) 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540
R2 0.0040 0.0041 0.0040 0.0453
F Statistic 8506 4769 7216 7374
*, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% condence, respectively.
Dependent variable is the households average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized
by average control group consumption in the Post period.
The ATE represents combination of Monthly and Quarterly groups.
Specication I: Optimal set of conditioning variables Z: Baseline Usage only.
Specication II: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: All observed demographic variables
Specication III: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: Only demographic variables statistically sig-
nicantly associated with the treatment e¤ect.
Specication IV: No conditioning variables.
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8.6 Proling and Cost E¤ectiveness
Assignment Mechanism All I II III
Expected ATE (percent) -0.0173 -0.0338 -0.0322 -0.0328
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0032 )
Electricity Bill Savings (dollars/household-year) 18.42 36.05 34.32 34.89
( 1.74 ) ( 3.49 ) ( 3.44 ) ( 3.45 )
Cost E¤ectiveness (cents/kwh saved) 5.25 2.68 2.82 2.77
( 0.50 ) ( 0.26 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.27 )
Percent of Households Assigned Same as II 0.497 0.678
Percent of Households Assigned Same as III 0.497 0.690 0.717
ATE is in percent of Control group usage in the post-treatment period.
The ATE represents combination of Monthly and Quarterly groups.
Assignment Mechanism "All": Assign to treatment all households, or a randomly-selected subset.
Assignment Mechanism I: Optimal set of conditioning variables Z: Baseline Usage only.
Assignment Mechanism II: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: All observed demographic variables
Assignment Mechanism III: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: Only demographic variables statis-
tically signicantly associated with the treatment e¤ect.
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9 Figures
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9.2 Home Energy Reports: Action Steps Module
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9.3 US Household Electricity Use
Source: US national average from 2001 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (US Energy Information
Administration 2001).
9.4 Treatment E¤ects Over Time
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9.5 Treatment E¤ects by Decile of Baseline Usage
9.6 Proling: Treatment E¤ects for Di¤erent Zj
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9.7 Gains from Proling
9.8 Treatment Group Near Mean Comparison Cuto¤
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